A Study of Chinese Consumer Preferences for Sustainably Farmed Seafood by Zou, Chao
University of Rhode Island 
DigitalCommons@URI 
Open Access Dissertations 
2017 
A Study of Chinese Consumer Preferences for Sustainably 
Farmed Seafood 
Chao Zou 
University of Rhode Island, zorrozouchao@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/oa_diss 
Recommended Citation 
Zou, Chao, "A Study of Chinese Consumer Preferences for Sustainably Farmed Seafood" (2017). Open 
Access Dissertations. Paper 655. 
https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/oa_diss/655 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Open Access Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more 
information, please contact digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu. 
A STUDY OF CHINESE CONSUMER PREFERENCES 
FOR SUSTAINABLY FARMED SEAFOOD 
BY 
CHAO ZOU 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND 
2017 
 DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DISSERTATION 
 
OF 
 
CHAO ZOU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPROVED:  
 
Dissertation Committee: 
 
Major Professor Hirotsugu Uchida 
 
   Todd Guilfoos 
 
   Jeremy Collie 
 
      Nasser H. Zawia 
  DEAN OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND 
2017 
 
  
ABSTRACT 
Sustainable seafood programs have developed and evolved for approximately two 
decades as a market-based mechanism to complement the traditional “command and 
control” fishery management scheme. In some cases, they have successfully 
incentivized fishmen/fish farmers around the world to implement more 
environmentally sustainable production practices. It is not a perfect system capable of 
solving every fishery management issue immediately, but it is unequivocally one of 
the most promising mechanisms to slow down the degradation of wild fishery stocks 
or reduce environmental impacts from aquaculture, while improving the resilience of 
coastal fishery communities. As wild fishery stocks continue to decline, aquaculture 
production is becoming the main global seafood source. There is also increased 
awareness and importance of environmental impacts and consumer preferences of 
farmed seafood. 
China is the largest producer and consumer of farmed seafood; thus, aquaculture 
sustainability is an important concern of both the Chinese government and its seafood 
industry. The promotion of sustainably farmed seafood, however, has not recently 
been successful in China. Some reasons could be the ineffectiveness of marketing 
strategies and lack of consumer awareness. This dissertation makes use of the well-
developed Chinese online retail market and an experimental auction to conduct three 
studies evaluating the impact of the country of origin, eco-labels, and certification 
standards information on consumer preferences for farmed seafood. By incorporating 
consumers’ subjective perceptions of quality, food safety, and eco-friendliness, we 
  
were able to allocate consumer willingness to pay (WTP) for a product into basic 
product attributes. 
Combining three studies draws the following conclusions. Among farmed 
seafood products, imported seafood is the Chinese consumers’ first choice when there 
is no safety information. With guaranteed food safety, a higher price premium is 
generated for domestic farmed seafood, but not for imported. An eco-label does not 
generate a price premium in the current market, but consumers are willing to pay for it 
as long as they are informed of the public benefits of sustainable certification. Private 
and public benefit information, together, can significantly increase consumer WTP for 
sustainably farmed seafood, especially regarding safety and eco-friendliness. In sum, 
this thesis confirms the significant potential of the sustainably farmed seafood market 
in China and suggests seafood producers and retailers participate in sustainable 
seafood programs. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As the world’s largest seafood producer and consumer, China needs a more 
sustainable seafood production system, as well as a more environmentally friendly 
seafood market. China has a coastline of 14,500 kilometers (km), a little less than the 
19,924 km of the US coastline (CIA 2017). If the offshore islands are included, 
China’s coastline increases to 32,000 km, with an Exclusive Economic Zone of 
3,880,000 square km (Chen and Zhang 2009). Wide extended continent shelves, 
multiple river inputs, and the interaction of cold and warm currents provide China 
with rich fishery resources. Historically, China had four major fishing grounds with 
more than twenty high-yield species (Chen 2009; Chen 2014). However, after two 
decades of heavy exploitation in the 1980s and 1990s, traditional high-yield species, 
like little yellow croaker (Pseudosciaena polyactis) and large yellow croaker 
(Larimichthys crocea), in Yellow Sea and East China Sea almost became extinct. 
Today, most remaining fisheries rely on pelagic species and lower trophic-level fish 
like sardines, anchovies, mackerel, crustaceans, and mollusks (Chen 2014). However, 
FAO fishery statistics indicate that China has been consistently landing more than 10 
million tons (MT) of marine fish, crustaceans, and mollusks since 1995, reaching an 
historic production of 15 MT in 2015, accounting for 19% of global catch (FAO 
2016). Although China’s marine fishery landings have remained high over the past 
decade, there is an obvious trend of decline in fish size and diversity. A recent 
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Greenpeace investigation indicates that at least 30% of fish landings in China were at 
the juvenile stage or younger; half of which were from non-selective bottom trawlers. 
Within those immature fish, 96 of 218 species had considerable economic value if 
allowed to mature. In 2014, an estimated 2.22 MT of small-sized marine fish were 
ground into fishmeal, and another 4.95 MT were used in aquaculture (Greenpeace 
2017). More sustainable fishery production and market systems need to be established 
in China to address the issues that lead to the collapsing Chinese inshore fisheries. 
Along with the depletion of wild fisheries over the past two decades, China has 
experienced a rapidly growing economy and increased seafood demand. From 1995 to 
2015, China’s GDP soared from US $734,548 million to US $11,064,664 million (The 
World Bank 2017). During the same period, China’s total seafood consumption 
increased from 26 to 50 MT, with nearly all of the increase derived from the 
aquaculture sector (FAO 2017).  
China’s aquaculture has played an extremely important role in supporting its 
domestic economy and securing food supplies. The history of aquaculture in China 
dates back 3000 years, with Asian carp as the first cultivated species. Marine species 
farming, or mariculture, started about 50 years ago. The expansion of mariculture has 
flourished over the past decade, as wild stocks gradually started to decline and 
domestic seafood demand increased rapidly. Mariculture in China covers a range of 
products, including aquatic plants, crustaceans, shellfish, and finfish. Crustaceans have 
historically commanded the highest unit price. 
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Aquaculture in China has created a series of environmental and social issues that 
have been ignored for a long time. One of the biggest problems is due to the use of 
wild-stock based fishmeal in aquaculture. China provides more than 50% of world 
aquaculture products, but at the same time it has consumed at least one MT of 
fishmeal every year since 2000 (Han et al. 2016). Due to the inefficiency of feeding 
methods and low conversion ratio for carnivores in aquaculture, a large number of 
wild fish were wasted. China needs more sustainably sourced fishmeal and plant-
based fishmeal, and fish farmers need to improve their farming practices, like adopting 
more accurate feeding techniques. This will help mitigate the intense pressure on 
China’s wild fish stocks.  
Another issue affecting farmed seafood in China is the overuse of antibiotics. The 
pursuit of maximum unit production often leads farmers to intensive ponds or cages 
and excessive feeding. Protein residues from fishmeal can heavily contaminate the 
water during the summer months and increase the chance of serious disease. Large 
amounts of antibiotics are often mixed with fishmeal to prevent disease outbreaks. 
Overdosing will not only increase drug residues within the seafood but also damage 
the surrounding waters and wetlands through the effluent of wastewater. Fortunately, a 
number of Chinese fish farms have already acquired sustainable aquaculture 
certifications, such as Best Aquaculture Practices (BAP) and Aquaculture Stewardship 
Council (ASC) certification. These producers were initially certified to gain market 
access of Western countries like the UK and US, but in the past few years, they 
reverted to the Chinese domestic market due to intensified competition in international 
markets and increasing demand from the Chinese domestic market.  
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To date, a limited number of eco-labeled domestic seafood products can be found 
in the Chinese market. Chinese certified producers hesitate to maintain sustainable 
standards for the domestic market because they are unsure about Chinese consumer 
preferences for these products. The concept of sustainable seafood is relatively new in 
China. Although constant efforts have been made by international non-governmental 
organizations, seafood companies, and the Chinse government, Chinese consumers 
have not responded positively, and market share and the acceptance of sustainable 
seafood remains low (Fabinyi 2016). 
This dissertation investigates Chinese consumer preferences for sustainably 
farmed seafood from an economic point of view using both revealed preference and 
stated preference data. The study also provides marketing suggestions and policy 
implications to facilitate the promotion of sustainably farmed seafood in China. The 
research findings are summarized into three areas. First, seafood safety is the biggest 
concern for Chinese consumers. They prefer imported seafood when there is no safety 
information provided. However, when they have guaranteed safety, they select 
domestic seafood. Meanwhile, guaranteed safety can generate a high premium for 
domestic seafood versus products without a safety guarantee. But there is no such 
certification for imported seafood. Second, eco-friendliness does not generate a price 
premium in the current market, but consumers are willing to pay for it as long as they 
are informed with public benefit information. Third, fully explained certification 
information can significantly increase consumer WTP for sustainably farmed seafood, 
most of which is due to their changes in perception regarding safety and eco-
friendliness. 
 5 
 
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. Chapter 2 investigates 
whether price premium exists, and the impact of information provided, of sustainably 
farmed seafood using online retailers’ real market data. Chapter 3 uses an 
experimental auction method to estimate consumer WTP for sustainably farmed 
seafood under different information scenarios. Chapter 4 is an extension of Chapter 3. 
It incorporates consumers’ subjective perceptions to estimate their WTP for the quality, 
safety, and eco-friendliness of sustainably farmed seafood. Chapter 5 concludes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF ONLINE RETAILERS’ INFORMATION ON THE 
PRICE OF SUSTAINABLY FARMED SEAFOOD 
 
Introduction 
In an addition to wild capture fisheries, aquaculture makes a valuable contribution to 
providing high-quality, affordable protein to the world, especially in developing 
countries. It has, however, created intensive pressure on natural resources and the 
environment. FAO statistics indicate that total global aquaculture production 
(including both saltwater and freshwater) has exceeded capture fisheries since 2013, 
and global marine aquaculture has increased rapidly over the past two decades (FAO 
2011). Figure 2.1 shows the rapidly growing trend of global aquaculture production 
from 1950 to 2015. FAO projects that aquaculture will be responsible for almost two-
thirds of the fish we eat by 2030.  
While enjoying the benefits of this rapidly growing aquaculture industry, it is 
critical to have a clear vision of its environmental impacts and correctly relay this 
information to the general public. Cao et al. (2015) found that Chinese aquaculture 
consumed 1.4 MT of fishmeal in 2012, equivalent to 6.7 MT of live-weight forage fish 
(e.g., anchovy, sardine, herring, and menhaden). Extend this number to the global 
aquaculture industry, and it is estimated that 20 MT of live-weight fish are processed 
into fishmeal every year, accounting for more than 20% of total global wild capture 
production. At the same time, it should be noted that traditional farming practices have 
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heavily damaged the natural environment. Destructive farm construction often 
decimates coastal wetlands, such as mangroves and saltmarshes. The effluent of 
untreated wastewater that contains fishmeal residue could cause eutrophication in the 
watershed. Overdosed antibiotics, drugs, and other chemical compounds could impair 
the health of the entire ecosystem.  
The concept of sustainable aquaculture was created about a decade ago following 
a similar philosophy of sustainable wild fishery programs, such as MSC certification, 
but it has additional standards on seafood quality and safety. Although the number of 
sustainably certified aquaculture facilities and products is experiencing rapid growth, 
the amount of sustainable production accounts only for a small portion of global 
output. In 2010, only 4.2% of total aquaculture production was certified (Jonell et al. 
2013). A more recent report from Global Good Agricultural Practice, a world leading 
sustainable aquaculture certifier, indicates that they have certified 2.1 of MT seafood, 
accounting for about 2% of global production. Jim Heerin, the president of BAP 
Management, indicated that they certified less than one MT of production in 2015. 
ASC, another sustainable aquaculture giant, supplied about 0.5 MT of seafood to the 
market in 2015 (ASC 2017). An optimistic estimate is that 10% of farmed seafood has 
been sustainably certified. Thus, the impacts of sustainable aquaculture on the natural 
environment and resources remain limited. It is not because of deficiencies in 
sustainable standards,  but due to a constrained production quantity caused by a 
complicated certification process and high costs (Belton et al. 2010; Ponte 2012; Bush 
et al. 2013; Gutierrez et al. 2016). In other words, producers and retailers, especially 
in developing countries, do not have enough economic incentive to become engaged in 
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sustainable programs. More producers and retailers are needed to increase the impact 
of sustainably farmed seafood. More importantly, consumer recognition and 
confidence is needed for further development of the entire industry. 
This chapter takes advantage of the well-developed Chinese online seafood 
market, aiming to understand the impacts of seafood quality, safety, and eco-
friendliness information on market price, particularly on whether price premium exists 
for these attributes. Sustainably farmed seafood was introduced into the Chinese 
market about five years ago, and the online retail market is one of the key distribution 
channels. During the early stage of the movement, only a few imported products 
carried aquaculture eco-labels. Most domestic certified seafood products were 
exported to Western countries. But as demand gradually increased in mainland China, 
more local products started to carry aquaculture eco-labels. Market observations 
provide anecdotal evidence on the positive price premium for certified seafood, but it 
has not yet been determined whether these certified aquaculture products can generate 
a profit. Also, it is not certain whether there exists a premium for certification, country 
of origin, or other attribute information. With multiple standards on seafood quality, 
safety, and eco-friendliness, if aquaculture certification generates a significant price 
premium, to what attribute(s) should the premium be ascribed? To date, very little 
quantitative research has been conducted to answer these questions.  
Another innovation of this research is to utilize sales price data and product 
descriptions from online retailers’ websites. Online shopping is different from 
traditional shopping, where consumers can spend more time comparing products and 
evaluating the information provided by retailers. A highly competitive online retail 
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market is a transparent trading platform where consumers can easily access 
information of various products and retailers in a few minutes, forcing retailers to 
update their prices frequently based on sales. A log-linear hedonic price model 
suggests that there is a 6.6% premium for imported products when there is no farming 
environment, safety, or eco-label information provided. When safety information is 
provided, results indicate a higher safety premium for domestic certified shrimp over 
imported. In sum, Chinese consumers place more trust in imported seafood when they 
have enough information to assist in decision making, but they still prefer domestic 
shrimp when there is a safety guarantee. To our surprise, eco-labels on websites have a 
negative impact on price. 
This chapter is arranged as follows. The next section presents a brief literature 
review of related topics and indicates the contribution of this research. The third 
section describes the data structure, followed by model specification and estimation. 
Results and discussion are next, and the final section concludes and reports on policy 
implications. 
 
Background 
It is vital to sustainable seafood programs and the seafood industry to show the true 
effect of sustainability information on sustainable seafood price. Different methods are 
adopted by scholars depending upon data availability. In the early 2000s when 
sustainable seafood markets were becoming established, no market data was available, 
so stated preference methods were used more frequently. Using the contingent choice 
survey method, Wessells, Johnston, and Donath (1999) assessed the influence of 
 10 
 
certification on US consumer preferences for eco-labeled seafood. Johnston et al. 
(2000) measured the difference between US and Norwegian consumer preferences for 
organic, eco-labeled, and regular seafood using the choice survey method. Jaffry et al. 
(2004) evaluated consumer choices for quality and sustainably labeled seafood 
products in the UK through a choice experiment. Other researchers conducted similar 
analysis on agricultural and wood products (Loureiro, McCluskey, and Mittelhammer 
2001a; O’Brien and Teisl 2004). All these hypothetical choice experiments conclude 
that consumers in Europe and the US are willing to pay a price premium for eco-
labeled products, but no actual market premiums were estimated.  
As more retailers committed to sustainable seafood, and consumers were exposed 
to the concept, market data subsequently became available for analysis. Roheim, 
Asche, and Santos (2011) found a 14.2% price premium was paid for MSC-labeled 
products by UK consumers using retailer scanner data. In addition to a seafood eco-
label, Bronnmann and Asche (2016) found a price premium for brands and private 
labels using German scanner household panel data and concluded that private-label 
products were discounted by 20%. However, the branded products and certified 
aquaculture products received substantial premiums. 
Most previous research has focused on sustainable seafood products from the 
capture fisheries, and little attention has been paid to certified aquaculture products. 
Unlike wild fishery eco-labels, sustainable aquaculture certification does not only 
require achievement of public benefits, like environmental impacts and fishery stocks, 
but also has standards to ensure consumer private benefits like food quality and safety. 
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Thus, the impact of aquaculture eco-labels is, by definition, very different from that of 
wild fishery eco-labels.  
This chapter uses online retailers’ price and product information to evaluate the 
impact of information on Chinese consumer preferences. Detailed product descriptions 
from the websites ensure the delivery of information to consumers, especially for eco-
label information. Previous studies take the eco-label as one integrated attribute, while 
using online retail data can separate it into multiple basic attributes, like food quality, 
safety, and eco-friendliness. This is a substantial improvement for sustainable seafood 
attribute analysis, and the results can be more informative and useful. 
 
Data description 
White-leg shrimp (Penaeus vannamei) is used as the representative species for farmed 
seafood because it is one of the most commonly produced and consumed seafood in 
China and worldwide. White-leg shrimp is native to the eastern Pacific Ocean. It was 
first cultured in Florida, USA, using mated females from Panama in 1973. White-leg 
shrimp farming started in the Latin America in the 1990s, and began gaining 
popularity in a few Asian countries around 2000 due to its high productivity and low 
farming costs (approximately USD 2.5–3.0/kg for P. vannamei, compared to USD 
3.0–4.0/kg for more extensive P. monodon culture) (FAO 2016). Currently, Ecuador 
and China are two of its biggest producers (Huntington and Hasan 2009; FAO 2011).  
Two types of data were used in this research: (1). weekly online price data from 
different retailers collected through a price tracking website (manmanbuy.com) from 
June 17, 2016 to April 30, 2017, and (2) product attribute information collected 
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through retailers’ webpages. Sampled products are all frozen raw white-leg shrimp 
produced in either China or Ecuador. Some were certified as sustainable by a third 
party and some not. Table 2.1 displays the variables and a summary of the descriptive 
statistics. 
In Table 2.1, product attribute information is divided into three blocks that fully 
capture product characteristics (Darby and Karni 1973; Ford, Smith, and Swasy 1988). 
The first block is search attributes. Consumers could evaluate these attributes through 
pre-purchase searching activities. Nearly all retailers provide this type of information 
on their product webpage, and it is easily verified. The second block is additional 
information provided by retailers to differentiate their products from others. These 
experience attributes are difficult are difficult to verify before purchasing, since only 
when the product is received or consumed, can the consumer discern the truthfulness 
of the information. The last block contains the credence attributes, which are the major 
focus of this research. These attributes build on consumer trust of the retailers and 
certifiers, and such information could possibly induce a price premium. 
The search attributes were examined first. The most important variable, the 
dependent variable, is price. Originally, daily prices were collected from 
“manmanbuy.com,” but the data were averaged into weekly prices because retailers 
usually adjust their prices once a week. There is no benefit to having repeated samples 
in the dataset. The average weekly price for all products is about 57 yuan/500 g (US 
$8/pound). Whole shrimp comprises 66.8% of the samples; the rest are peeled. Shrimp 
size varies from small to jumbo. The criteria used are from the size chart in 
international trade. For whole shrimp, small is about 41–60 count/pound, medium 31–
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40, large 21–30, and jumbo 16–20. For peeled shrimp, small is about 51–70 
count/pound, medium 41–50, large 31–40, and jumbo 21–25. In this dataset, the 
average size is between medium and large, but closer to medium. Package size is 
another important factor that impacts retail price. Large-sized packages tend to have a 
lower price. Frozen shrimp sold online has an average weight of 1,179 grams (2.6 
pounds). Product ratings can be found on the product webpage, which is automatically 
generated by the system and cannot be altered by retailers. It serves as a 
comprehensive evaluation for both the product and retailer services. The most recent 
scores were used to represent product ratings for two reasons. First, it is extremely 
difficult to acquire daily ratings of each product from retailers or Alibaba.com (the 
online retail platform). Second, since most products have been launched for a long 
time and received tens of thousands of reviews, product ratings would not change 
significantly during our research period. This is a control variable for retailers’ 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
The experience attributes are the retailers’ statements regarding freshness, 
product weight, and ice glazing rate. Basically, they are describing products quality, 
which can be verified by consumers upon arrival. These attributes are dummy 
variables that take the value 1 if retailers claim such an attribute on the website and 0 
otherwise. Usually different retailers use similar descriptions and images to illustrate 
these characteristics. For example, they use phrases such as “Fresh out of the water, 
frozen immediately to –30º F, fast shipping and guaranteed fresh at your door, and full 
refund if not satisfied” to describe the freshness of their products. Ice rate is a very 
specific attribute that many consumers may not notice. Normally, frozen seafood is 
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glazed with a layer of saltwater and chemicals to maintain moisture during shipping. 
But this reduces the actual product weight. About 10% of the products guarantee that 
the shrimp will meet the displayed package weight after defrosting. However, less 
than 3% of the products indicate the actual ice rate contained in the package.  
Five credence attributes are included in the analysis, all of which are dummy 
variables. The first one is “imported.” Imported products have a special appeal to 
Chinese consumers regardless of origin because stringent import custom’s inspection 
is viewed as insurance for product quality and safety. Frequent domestic food safety 
incidents destroy consumer confidence in domestic products. Thus an “imported” label 
is expected to have some impact on the price, and 60% of our samples are from 
Ecuador.  
Safety is another key factor that impacts the price. As mentioned above, food 
safety is extremely important in China. Government and retailers have invested a great 
amount of resources to improve food safety during production and retailing. Typical 
safety information displayed by online retailers is a copy of safety inspection 
certificate, such as Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP). According to the 
FDA (2017) definition, “HACCP is a systematic preventive approach to food safety 
from biological, chemical, and physical hazards in production processes that can cause 
the finished product to be unsafe, and designs measurements to reduce these risks to a 
safe level.” Additional presentation of safety information includes descriptive 
statements guaranteeing no antibiotic use. About 40% of the products in the dataset 
contain safety information. Farm environment is mentioned by 32% of products, 
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which emphasize the water quality at the farm. It is a vague concept that can be 
viewed as a representation of both quality and safety.  
The variable “eco-label” indicates whether or not the product webpage explicitly 
displays a sustainable seafood certification label like, “BAP.” Only 9% of products 
display an eco-label. However, about 38% of the products in the dataset are actually 
sustainably certified. The reason why retailers hesitate to display an eco-label on a 
Chinese website may be the lack of Chinese consumers’ confidence in and knowledge 
of the label, as well as additional costs of using them. Most domestic producers get 
certified because they need such designation for international market access. 
Regarding the domestic market, this certification was not as important as in the 
Western market.  
An additional variable “certified” was added to capture the product’s quality 
improvement through the certification program. It is not an attribute for eco-
friendliness, since consumers are not informed of the certification. The only way for 
the “certified” attribute to impact consumers is through the repurchase behavior 
caused by the product consumption experience. In other words, products that are 
certified but do not contain an eco-label are assumed to be of higher quality, attracting 
consumers to purchase again and pay higher prices. 
 
Model specification and estimation 
Following previous research by Roheim, Asche, and Santos (2011) and Bronnmann 
and Asche (2016), a log-linear hedonic price model was adopted for the analysis. This 
price model was developed by Lancaster (1966) and Rosen (1974) to evaluate 
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consumer demand for product attributes. It is widely used in the assessment of non-
market value of environmental and natural resources (Ready and Abdalla 2005; 
Sander and Polasky 2009; Gopalakrishnan et al. 2011), as well as product attributes 
(Sogn-Grundvåg, Larsen, and Young 2014; Wang 2016). The value of a price-
determining attribute can be evaluated by the presence or absence of the attribute 
within the product (Wessells 2002). Thus, a general model can be written as 
following: 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒1, … 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑛), 
where 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 is product i’s price at time period t, and is determined by a function 
of n attributes. 
The functional model is shown as: 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 ∗ 𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛽4𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙_𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖
+ 𝛽8𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑒𝑐𝑜_𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖
+ 𝛽12𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 ∗ 𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽13𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 ∗ 𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑝_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑠
3
𝑠=1
+ ∑ 𝜃𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑟
4
𝑟=1
+ ∑ 𝜑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑐
6
𝑐=1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where ln(priceit) is the price of product i at time period t in logarithmic form; 
package sizei is the only continuous variable, and is the package size of product i in 
100 grams. All other variables are dummies. Safetyi, farmi, and eco-labeli are dummy 
variables indicating whether or not the website provides product safety information, 
farm environmental condition information, and an eco-label respectively. Certifiedi is 
a variable that indicates whether or not product i has achieved certification even if this 
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information is not shown on the website. Variables such as import, whole, freshness, 
full_weight, ice_rate, Shrimp_size, rating and city are also controlled as dummies. 
Three interaction terms are added to test the cross effects of those variables. Some 
other factors, like product brand and retail brand, are not included in the model since 
they are highly collinear with some independent variables. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an individual specific 
error term that contains all other factors that are not included in the model. 
𝛼 is the constant term, and 𝛽, 𝛿, 𝜃, and 𝜑 are variable coefficients to be estimated. 
Because this is a log-linear model, each estimated coefficient can be interpreted 
as the percentage marginal value of the attribute. For example, 𝛽1means that a 100 
gram increase in package weight will increase 
𝛽1
100
% in total price, ceteris paribus (this 
condition also applies to the following statements); 𝛽8 can be interpreted as the 
presence of safety information on the website can increase/decrease 
𝛽8
100
% in price, or 
consumers are more/less willing to pay 
𝛽8
100
% price for the safety information on the 
website. Interaction terms represent the effect of one variable on the other. For 
example, 𝛽3 can be interpreted as the price change rate difference between whole 
shrimp and peeled shrimp when package size increases by 100 grams. s, r, and c are 
indices of the variables. There are four shrimp sizes, thus three dummies. Product 
ratings could be considered continuous variables, but there are only five different 
values so we created four dummies. Retailer locations are represented by six dummies.  
Two estimation models are displayed in Table 2.2; one without interaction terms 
and one with them. The models were estimated using STATA software version 12. 
Several tests were conducted to ensure the efficiency and consistency of the results. 
First, homoscedasticity was rejected by the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for 
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both models. A clustered variance robust estimation was then used to correct for 
heteroscedasticity. Collinearity between independent variables was tested by checking 
the variance inflation factors (VIF). VIFs in Model 1 are under 10 with for variables, 
while interaction terms in Model 2 show larger VIFs. For adjusted R-square, Model 2 
has a higher value. Finally, after checking the magnitudes and signs of the coefficient 
estimates, Model 2 contains more insightful information and a better explanation due 
to the inclusion of interaction terms. Thus, it is used to interpret regression results in 
the following section.  
 
Results and discussion 
The results will be explained block by block. An F-test of the model rejected the null 
hypothesis that all estimated coefficients are jointly equal to zero. 
 
Search attributes: 
Products with large packages usually have lower unit prices. Here, since both whole 
and peeled shrimp are considered, the effects of package size on price are different. 
Together with the interaction term pack*whole, when it comes to peeled shrimp 
(whole=0), there is no significant price impact due to package size. For whole shrimp 
(whole=1), when package size increases by 100 grams, price decreases by 2.8%, all 
else equal. This is reasonable because peeled shrimp are usually sold in small 
packages, 200g or 500g, while whole shrimp packages can contain from 200g to 
2000g.  
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Experience attributes 
No experience attributes were expected to have positive impacts on product prices 
because they could be verified immediately after receiving the package. A retailers’ 
guarantee does not apply to returning customers, rather the first-time purchasers. New 
consumers do not comprise the major customer group of a well-established online 
market. Results indicate that a full-weight guarantee has a small positive premium of 
3.7%. Neither a freshness guarantee nor ice glazing rate information has a significant 
impact on prices. For most repeat buyers, this type of information is irrelevant. 
 
Credence attributes: 
As mentioned earlier, credence attributes are difficult to test or verify through normal 
consumption. Thus, the information provided by the retailers is very important for 
consumer’s decision-making. For the imported attribute, both safety and certified 
information can be interpreted together. Table 2.2 shows that without safety 
information (safety=0) or certification (cert=0), imported products have a 6.6% price 
premium over domestic products. When safety information is provided (safety=1), but 
the products are not certified (cert=0), domestic products are 37% more expensive 
than imported products. When there is no safety information (safety=0) but the 
products are certified (cert=1), consumers are willing to pay a 14.7% price premium 
for imported products. Finally, when there is safety information (safety=1) and the 
products are certified (cert=1), there is a 29% price premium for imported products. In 
conclusion, providing safety information is critical for domestic products. When there 
is no safety information, consumers generally prefer imported products.  
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For domestic products, safety information generates a 36% premium, while it 
does not generate a positive price premium on imported products. On the whole, there 
is a 44% premium difference between domestic and imported seafood in terms of 
safety information. Certification has no significant impact on domestic products, but 
generates an 8% price premium on imported shrimp. This means that imported, 
certified shrimp are of higher quality and consumers have realized this through 
repeated consumption. For certified domestic shrimp, consumers did not perceive a 
significant difference in quality from uncertified shrimp; thus, there is no premium 
found.  
Results also indicate a 8.4% premium when retailers provide positive information 
about the farm environment, but no positive effect is observed for an eco-label. The 
descriptive words that retailers use for farm environment are always vague, and 
appealing pictures seem very attractive to consumers, leading to the assumption that 
the farm environment is related to shrimp quality and safety. Since safety information 
has already been included, the farm environment might be more relevant to quality. 
Only 9% of products display an eco-label and it a negative effect on shrimp price. It is 
probably because Chinese consumers are still very unfamiliar with the concept and 
have some doubt about the credibility of the producers and certifiers. This lack of trust 
is very critical to the expansion and development of sustainable seafood in China.  
 
Other attributes: 
Other attributes, such as shrimp size, product rating, and retailer location are also 
included in the regression. Since they are not our main focus, we will only summarize 
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them here. Ratings do not seem to impact prices significantly. Only products with a 
100% score have an 8% price premium. Shrimp sizes impact price significantly.  
Medium, large, and extra-large shrimp have a price premium of 4, 9, and 25%, 
respectively, over small-sized shrimp. In terms of location, with Beijing as the base, 
Dalian, Guangzhou, and Ningbo are not significantly different from Beijing. 
Hangzhou and Shanghai are 5% cheaper, which may be due to their better geographic 
location and more advanced logistics industry. 
 
Conclusion 
Promotion of sustainable seafood has never been an easy job anywhere in the world. It 
requires a long-term commitment from all players within the supply chain, as well as 
awareness and acceptance from consumers. Initiating a new product campaign without 
support from consumers is almost an impossible mission. Recent research shows that 
North American consumers do not have enough incentives to pay a premium for 
sustainable seafood. Corporate efforts are mostly a social responsibility created by 
mainstream retailers to improve their image and reputation. So far, very limited 
positive environmental impact has been generated through programs or campaigns. 
Thus, it is not suggested to promote sustainable seafood applying marketing strategies 
in Western world to China, especially when Chinese consumers have lower incomes 
and are more sensitive to food prices. Fostering consumer awareness and generating 
consumer demand are the keys to the success in the Chinese market.  
This study suggests that seafood safety is the biggest concern of Chinese 
consumers. For domestic shrimp, safety information generates a 36% price premium, 
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while safety information does not affect the price for imported products. When there is 
no safety information, there is a 14.6 and 6.6% price premium for imported certified 
products and non-certified products over domestic products, respectively.Good 
farming environment also generates a 8% premium. These results tell retailers to focus 
more on seafood quality and safety, regardless of source. It is also a good strategy to 
combine sustainability with quality and safety information for certified farmed 
seafood instead of simply pushing the relatively new concept of sustainability to 
Chinese consumers. At the policy level, the Chinese government has already noticed 
the difference between export-oriented and domestic-oriented production and 
launched new policies last year to ensure they were from the same production line 
with consistent labelling and standards. This may bolster Chinese consumer 
confidence in domestic products, but only the passing of time will demonstrate their 
effectiveness and impacts on Chinese consumer behavior. 
Some concerns of this research fall on consumer perception of online retailers’ 
information. Because every piece of information is provided by retailers, consumers’ 
opinions could not be assessed. Their level of understanding of this information is 
uncertain. The eco-label information is a very typical example. One cannot deny the 
contribution of eco-labels, simply because there are no significant effects from the 
regression. Most Chinese consumers are not familiar with the standards and values 
associated with these labels, as they are basically some unrecognized symbols. If more 
explanatory information is provided, consumers may elicit different responses. The 
following chapters use stated preference methods, like experimental auctions, which 
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will capture both consumer WTP and perceptions on the information they receive. 
More precise conclusions can be formulated through this type of research.
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Figure 2.1. Comparison of Global Aquaculture and 
Wild Seafood Production 
Total Aqua
Total Wild
Marine Aqua
Marine Wild
Data source: FAO Fishery Statistics 2017.  
 
Notes: Total Aqua indicates total global aquaculture production; Total Wild indicates 
total global wild fisheries production; Marine Aqua indicates global marine aquaculture 
production; Marine Wild indicates global marine wild fisheries production. 
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Table 2.1. Product Attributes and Description 
Attribute Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Description 
Search attribute 
Price  57.732 17.039 Yuan/500g, weekly average price 
Shrimp size 2.352 0.871 Small=1, Medium=2, Large=3, Jumbo=4 
treated as dummies in regression 
Package size 1179.086 771.498 Grams 
Whole 0.668 0.471 Whole=1, peeled=0 
Product rating 97.304 1.628 Consumer rating of product; scale = 100 
points 
Experience attribute 
Freshness 
guaranty 
0.790 0.408 Dummy variable, yes=1, retailer’s claim of 
product freshness 
Weight 
guaranty 
0.104 0.306 Dummy variable, yes=1, retailer’s claim of 
product weight 
Ice rate 0.026 0.159 Dummy variable, yes=1, webpage 
description of ice glazing rate 
Credence attribute 
Imported 0.592 0.492 Dummy variable, yes=1, imported from 
Ecuador 
Safety 
information 
0.390 0.488 Dummy variable, yes=1, webpage 
description of product safety 
Farm 
environment  
0.322 0.468 Dummy variable, yes=1, webpage 
description of farming environment 
Eco-label 0.090 0.286 Dummy variable, yes=1, webpage 
description of product eco-label 
Certified 0.377 0.485 Dummy variable, yes=1, Sustainability 
certified by third party 
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Table 2.2. Model Coefficient Estimation Results 
Variable 
(1) (2) 
Price (in logs) Price (in logs) 
Constant 4.416*** 4.315*** 
 
(0.023) (0.025) 
Search attributes     
Package size (100g) –0.021*** 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.004) 
Whole shrimp (yes=1) –0.199*** –0.076*** 
 
(0.017) (0.022) 
Package size × whole shrimp 
 
–0.028*** 
  
(0.004) 
Experience attributes   
Guaranteed fresh (yes=1) –0.051*** –0.014 
 
(0.013) (0.015) 
Guaranteed full weight (yes=1) 0.103*** 0.037** 
 
(0.016) (0.015) 
Ice glazing rate information (yes=1) 0.579*** 0.045 
 
(0.066) (0.034) 
Credence attributes   
Imported from Ecuador (yes=1) –0.036 0.066** 
 
(0.029) (0.027) 
Safety information (yes=1) –0.099*** 0.364*** 
 
(0.019) (0.065) 
Farm environment information (yes=1) 0.107*** 0.084*** 
 
(0.017) (0.015) 
Eco-label on website (yes=1) 0.268*** –0.076** 
 
(0.039) (0.039) 
Sustainable certification (yes=1) 0.062*** 0.009 
 
(0.016) (0.034) 
Imported × safety 
 
–0.436*** 
  
(0.068) 
Imported × certified 
 
0.081*** 
  
(0.028) 
Observations 1,542 1,542 
Adjusted R-squared 0.738 0.745 
Pr>F 0 0 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05. 
All variable information is collected from product websites, except for the sustainable 
certification variable. This is verified by the author through the producer websites, 
which most consumers will not access. Other control variables not reported in this 
table include shrimp size, product rating, and retailer location. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE EFFECTS OF SUSTAINABILITY CERTIFICATION INFORMATION ON 
CHINESE CONSUMER WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR FARMED SEAFOOD 
 
Introduction 
Sustainably farmed seafood was introduced to China several years ago, but Chinese 
retailers and producers are still facing great challenges marketing it to the general 
public (Fabinyi 2016). Since late 1990s, sustainable seafood programs, like 
certification and eco-labeling, have been successfully developed and promoted in 
Europe and North America as a market-based tool to complement the traditional 
“command and control” fishery management scheme (Wessells, Johnston, and Donath 
1999; Johnston et al. 2001; Ponte 2012). However, the concept of sustainable seafood, 
especially farmed seafood, has not been well accepted in China despite almost 
constant effort dedicated to public education and supply chain engagement (Fabinyi 
2012; Fabinyi and Liu 2016). The challenges can be summarized in two categories: 
consumer awareness and consumer acceptance, both of which are the key to the 
success of sustainable seafood programs (Wessells 2002). In major Chinese cities, 
such as Beijing and Shanghai, consumers have some awareness of green-labeled/eco-
labeled
1
 seafood, but they are willing to pay a premium only if additional food quality 
or safety information is provided (Xu et al. 2012; Fabinyi 2016). Chinese consumers 
are more concerned with the private benefits of certified seafood than those associated 
                                                 
1
 A green-label is a Chinese domestic food certification similar to organic certification, but with lower 
standards. 
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with environment improvements. On the retail side, they are not familiar with, or do 
not pay much attention to, the multiple dimensions of aquaculture eco-label standards. 
Thus, they cannot effectively deliver this information to consumers. To the best of our 
knowledge, no research has been conducted regarding the impact of consumer 
purchasing behavior on the private and public benefit information of farmed seafood 
certification. Providing scientific evidence and solutions to these challenges can 
facilitate both retailers and producers in reaching more sustainable goals for their 
businesses. They can also provide insights to the Chinese government on ongoing 
fisheries reform (Cao et al. 2015, 2017). 
Another concern is whether or not consumers really care about the eco-
friendliness of sustainable seafood (Wessells 2002; Gulbrandsen 2006; Uchida et al. 
2014b). There is a consensus that eco-labeled seafood generates a 10–20% price 
premium over non-labeled, but it is hard to draw a solid conclusion that consumers are 
willing to pay for eco-friendliness. In previous studies, consumers are not given full 
information about the standards of certification or eco-labels, and market data, like 
retailer scanner data, captures neither consumer’s demographic information nor their 
perceptions about the implications of eco-labels attached to the seafood. It is 
inappropriate to apply the conclusions of wild seafood studies to farmed seafood 
because they have different certification standards. Unlike sustainable wild seafood 
with pure public benefits, such as environmental and community concerns, sustainably 
farmed seafood standards also consider consumers’ private benefits like seafood 
quality and safety (Roheim, Sudhakaran, and Durham 2012).  
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Again, this study applies the experimental auction method and uses sustainably 
farmed seafood as an example to investigate Chinese consumer WTP for private and 
public benefit information provided by certification. Inspired by Maslow’s Hierarchy 
of Needs, a similar figure for seafood consumption was created. Figure 3.1 shows that 
consumers want high-quality seafood and seafood safety, as well as environmental and 
social contributions. The demand for these attributes is pyramid shaped—physical 
needs form the base, and psychological needs are located on top. It is of great value to 
understand how consumers allocate their resources to different attributes of seafood 
and what factors impact their decisions. Sustainably farmed seafood is a good subject 
for this study because it covers most of the attributes outlined in the figure.  
This study indicates that: 1. Public benefit information has a significantly high 
impact on consumers’ WTP for certified products, whether domestic or imported, and 
it is necessary to provide public benefit information prior to private benefit 
information. 2. There exists preference for certification of imported products over 
domestic products, which reveals Chinese consumers’ lack of trust regarding the 
credibility of certifiers, as well as their opinions concerning the inability of domestic 
producers to be compliant. 3. Domestically certified products have a higher response 
to the information than imported certified products, which is a positive signal for 
domestic marketers and producers. 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. First, we briefly discuss the 
background of our study, explain the experimental design, and describe the data 
collected from experiment. This is followed by the regression models and results. The 
final section concludes the chapter. 
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Background 
Consumer preferences for wild sustainable seafood have been extensively studied for 
approximately two decades, while little research has been conducted on the farmed 
seafood sector (Roheim, Sudhakaran, and Durham 2012), particularly in developing 
countries. Researchers began to study the Chinese sustainable seafood market only a 
few years ago (Xu et al. 2012). Chinese consumer preferences for seafood are very 
different from those in Western countries due to unique social norms and the culinary 
culture, but their tastes are also changing with the times (Fabinyi and Liu 2016). In 
recent years, Chinese consumer demand for imported seafood has increased rapidly 
because of frequent outbreaks of domestic food safety incidents (Han and Bi 2016), 
coupled with fast-growing household income (The World Bank 2016). Chapter 2 
states that without safety information or certification, Chinese consumers are willing 
to pay a premium for imported seafood products; however, for certified domestic 
products with safety information, consumers tend to pay more. It is certain that 
Chinese consumers care about seafood safety more than other attributes, but due to the 
limit of eco-friendly information presented on websites, we could not tell whether or 
not they are willing to pay a price premium for that public benefit. This is an important 
area of research for the development of Chinese sustainable aquaculture, because only 
an accurate description of consumer preferences can help formulate effective 
marketing strategies.  
Seafood producers, especially sustainable seafood producers in China, rely 
heavily on exports and have very limited price bargaining power in international 
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markets. This can potentially cause a downturn for the expansion of sustainable 
seafood programs in China. The blue swimming crab Fishery Improvement Projects 
(FIPs) in Indonesia is an example.
2
 Totally relying on Western markets for fishery 
sustainability improvement is too risky for developing country fisheries. Generating 
domestic demand for sustainable seafood is an urgent task.  
Literature on consumer preferences for sustainable seafood started around 2000, 
when the first lot of sustainable seafood arrived in the European market. Wessells, 
Johnston, and Donath (1999) pointed out the importance of consumer knowledge and 
demand for market-based solutions to fishery sustainability. This paper outlines the 
impact of safety and quality information on consumer decision-making. This was the 
first seminal paper in the field and inspired a wide range of research. In early 2000, 
scholars focused on consumer preferences for eco-labeled wild seafood in North 
America and Europe. Contingent choice surveys were often used to test factors that 
influence consumer likelihood of its purchase (Wessells, Johnston, and Donath 1999; 
Johnston et al. 2001; Jaffry et al. 2004). Researchers unanimously conclude that 
consumers are willing to pay a price premium for eco-labeled products, but they did 
not evaluate the quantitative levels of the premium. After 2006 as more and more 
North American and European retailers started to commit to sustainable seafood, 
quantitative research was made possible by enriched market data. Roheim, Asche, and 
Santos (2011) applied scanner data from several London retailers to a hedonic model 
and found consumers were willing to pay a 14.2% price premium for MSC-certified 
                                                 
2
 Blue swimming crab FIPs in Indonesia were very successful at the beginning. However, they rely 
heavily on the Western market for sustainability development. When there were not enough economic 
incentives provided by Western buyers, they chose to degrade their fishing practices and switched to the 
local market. 
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seafood in the UK. Bronnmann and Asche (2016) used German market scanner data 
and found a much lower price premium (4%) for MSC-certified seafood and a higher 
premium for farmed seafood (28%). Besides the Western market, a few studies were 
also conducted in Japan and China. Onozaka et al. (2010) studied Japanese consumer 
preferences and acknowledge the positive attitudes of Japanese consumers toward 
sustainable seafood. Uchida et al. (2014b) confirm this with an auction experiment, 
finding a statistically significant premium of about 20% for MSC-labeled salmon over 
non-labeled when consumers are provided with information on both the status of 
global fish stocks and the purpose of the MSC program. Xu et al. (2012) found that 
Chinese consumers are willing to pay a price premium for eco-labeled seafood, and 
price is not a significant factor affect purchasing decisions. These results show 
promise for use in creating a sustainable seafood market in China. However, some 
studies show that very little of the price premium generated by eco-labeling will flow 
to producers (Stemle, Uchida, and Roheim 2015; Blomquist, Bartolino, and Waldo 
2015). Thus, there exists a great challenge to the further development of sustainable 
fishery programs, especially in developing countries. A local or domestic market could 
potentially solve this problem, since most eco-labeled seafood is now internationally 
traded, and the premiums have to be shared by multiple supply chain players. 
Producers are more likely to be rewarded for their sustainable practices by the support 
of local/domestic consumers. The first step of creating a domestic market is to have a 
comprehensive analysis of targeted consumers. 
Three research methods are commonly adopted by scholars. The most popular 
method is contingent choice experiment estimated by a multinomial probit/logit model 
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(Wessells, Johnston, and Donath 1999; Johnston et al. 2001; Loureiro, McCluskey, 
and Mittelhammer 2001; Jaffry et al. 2004; Roheim, Sudhakaran, and Durham 2012; 
Brécard et al. 2012; Uchida et al. 2014a). The choice experiment is a classic way to 
elicit consumer preference over a few options when revealed preference data is not 
available. Using a probit or logit model, it is easy to estimate consumer WTP for a few 
product attribute of interest. However, high cost and complicated design have limited 
the wide application of this method in developing countries. Revealed preference data 
is favored more with the popularization of sustainable seafood products from the 
retailing ends. Researchers can access retailers’ scanner data or online retail data 
through data service providers or simply online fetching. A hedonic model is useful 
for the estimation of consumer WTP for various product attributes (Roheim, Asche, 
and Santos 2011; Asche et al. 2015; Bronnmann and Asche 2016; Wang 2016). The 
disadvantage of this method is that it cannot incorporate consumer characteristics and 
test their impact on consumer behavior. According to Lusk’s research, consumer 
perception can significantly affect the interpretation of estimation results (Lusk, 
Schroeder, and Tonsor 2014). The last method discussed here is experimental auction. 
Consumer WTP for certain product attributes can be directly elicited from auction 
results. Information treatments can also be designed into the experiment to test their 
effectiveness. Further, pre- and post-experiment surveys can be conducted to collect 
personal information to complement the main experiment as needed (Uchida et al. 
2014b; Lusk, Schroeder, and Tonsor 2014). Some other research methods are also 
found in literature, such as using data from landings tickets and log books (Blomquist, 
Bartolino, and Waldo 2015), and interview-based analysis (Fabinyi and Liu 2016).  
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The method adopted in this study is the experimental auction, with the objective 
to estimate the treatment effects of private and public benefit information of an 
aquaculture eco-label on consumers’ WTP for sustainably farmed seafood. 
 
Experiment design and data description 
Similar to Chapter 2, white-leg shrimp (Penaeus vannamei) is used again as the 
representative species. All auctioned products in the experiment were whole, frozen 
shrimp of the same size to simplify the experiment procedure and data analysis. 
A sealed-bid, second-price auction was used, which means the highest price 
bidder wins the game, but pays the second-highest price. Over the past few decades, 
several auction methods have been designed to test consumers’ WTP, such as the 
English, Nth price, Becker-Degroot-Marschak (BDM), and random N
th
 price auctions. 
All these methods can be designed into incentive-compatible games, and all have 
advantages and disadvantages(Lusk 2003) . Based on our research objective, an easy-
to-understand method that can also receive controlled feedback from participants is 
desired. A second-price auction is a good option for this study, although there is 
evidence of subject overbidding (Kagel, Harstad, and Levin 1987; Lusk, Feldkamp, 
and Schroeder 2004). It is not a serious issue because the bidding difference within 
subjects is of the major research interest. 
A series of experimental auctions was conducted in the spring of 2017 in Xiamen, 
China, a southeast coastal city with a population of nearly 4 million people. Xiamen is 
a well-known city in China with a long history of inshore and offshore fisheries. 
Seafood has always played a vital role in its culinary culture. Due to the collapse of 
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wild fish stocks and the rapid increase of market demand, aquaculture has become its 
main source of seafood in recent years. Thus, it is considered a good place to focus our 
consumer preference analysis for sustainably farmed seafood in China. Below is a 
brief introduction of the participant structure and experiment design. 
Participants were recruited through social media of a few local organizations and 
groups. A screening survey was then used to ensure that research subjects were at least 
18 years old and regular seafood purchasers. After screening, 78 qualified residents 
participated in 8 experiment sessions, and 76 effective pre-auction surveys were 
received. Table 3.1 shows the participant demographics. About 70% are female, 
compared to a 51% female ratio in Xiamen city (Xiamen Statistics Bureau 2017). This 
is acceptable because food purchasing and cooking is mostly done by females in 
China. Due to screening, bias is expected on the gender distribution. Our age data 
ranges from 20s to 70s for the participants. We were not able to collect income data, 
because it is a very sensitive, private question to ask in China, but we gathered 
occupation data, which can partly represent income. Occupation data show that most 
of our participants are office workers, in sales, or teachers. This means they are near or 
at the average income class. Only 17% are students, and 27% are housewives or 
househusbands. In terms of purchasing frequency, 65% of participants purchase 
seafood 1–3 times a month. Twenty-two percent purchase once a week, and the rest 
usually purchase twice a week. Fifty percent of participants purchase seafood at a wet 
market, which is a Chinese tradition, but these outlets usually lack seafood 
information. The supermarket share is increasing annually, and it is expected to be the 
main channel in the future. A few participants buy online or directly from fishmen. 
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Survey results also show that consumer understanding of seafood sustainability 
remains at an extremely low level; 42% have never heard about it and another 40% 
have heard, but did not understand the concept. Only one participant had solid 
knowledge of sustainable seafood. It is a critical issue, but it also means most 
participants were at the same knowledge level, which provides a good opportunity to 
study the impact of information treatments on consumer behavior. Generally, this 
sample provides a good representation of the population of Xiamen City, as well as 
southern coastal cities similar to Xiamen. 
There are 8 sessions in this experiment and 9–12 participants in each session. All 
sessions consist of 12 rounds that are evenly divided into 3 blocks by information 
treatment. Four types of shrimp are used in this experiment: domestic/non-labeled 
shrimp (DN); domestic/eco-labeled shrimp (DE); imported/non-labeled shrimp (IN); 
and imported/eco-labeled shrimp (IE). Participants were asked to place their bids 
under different information scenarios. The auction orders of different product types 
were altered in each session to balance ordering effects, but the labeled and non-
labeled products were always adjacent to each other for better treatment effects. See 
Table 3.2 for the design. 
In block 1 (rounds 1 to 4), participants were shown pictures of four shrimp 
products, one at a time (Figure 3.2).
 3
 They were then given basic information 
regarding country of origin and eco-labeling of the products and were asked to submit 
their bids for each product. For example, in round 1 they were shown a picture of 
shrimp and told that they were farmed in mainland China and did not have an eco-
                                                 
3
 All pictures are from producers’ website. Product sizes were also controlled to minimize bias. 
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label. Then they were asked, “How much are you willing to pay for 500 grams of this 
product?” 
In block 2 (rounds 5 to 8), participants were given additional information about 
eco-labeling. In sessions 1–4, private benefit information was given, and in sessions 
5–8 public benefit information was provided. Then, participants repeated their 
activities as in block 1. 
In block 3 (rounds 9 to 12), we gave participants an additional piece of 
information that was not provided in block 2. Then, they repeated thee activities as in 
blocks 1 and 2. Detailed treatment information can be found in Table 3.3. The 
standards were adopted from “Best Aquaculture Practice Certification Standards, 
Guidelines” (BAP 2017). So as not to bias participants’ valuation, we did not mention 
which certifying body provided the information.   
Each session started by reading the introduction, objectives, and rationale of the 
research, followed by the optimal bidding strategy. Following Uchida et al.(2014b), 
the bidding strategy was explained and demonstrated. This could potentially lead to 
slightly higher average bids than those using other methods (Lusk et al. 2004), but this 
bias should appear equally across treatments. A practice round was played for candy 
bars to familiarize participants with the auction mechanism. For incentive 
compatibility, after 12 rounds of bidding we used a lottery system to decide one 
winner for real purchase. All participants received 150 yuan (about US $25) of 
compensation, except for the winners. The winners had to purchase the product of the 
winning round at the second highest price using part of their compensation and 
received the rest of the money. Since it is impractical and unhygienic to award actual 
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shrimp products, prizes were delivered from online retailers to the winners’ homes 
directly.  
 
Data description 
Panel data using 78 individuals and 12 time-period rounds resulted in 936 sample 
points. The dependent variable is the bid placed by individuals in each round, and 
dependent variables are product forms and information treatments. See Table 3.4 for 
the summary statistics of the main variables. The average bidding for all products is 
around 35 yuan (about US $6), which is close to the true market value for 500 grams 
of shrimp in China. Product types and information treatments are all dummy variables. 
All four product types are evenly tested throughout the experiment. For information 
treatments, basic information was given in sessions 1‒8; private and private + public 
benefit information was given in sessions 1‒4; public and public + private benefit 
information was given in sessions 5‒8. The sample sizes are nearly identical for the 
two parts. 
Tables 3.5–3.8 display the treatment effects. First, all bidding is separated into 
two groups of country of origin and eco-labeling to evaluate consumers’ average WTP 
for each category and test whether or not there is a price premium for imported 
products and eco-labeled products. As shown in Table 3.5, columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 list 
the means and standard deviations of each category. Columns 3 and 7 show the 
differences of imported versus domestic products and eco-labeled versus non-labeled 
products. Columns 4 and 8 display the t-values of the differences tested using a paired 
t-test at the 95% confidence interval. All bidding is also categorized by information 
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treatments from basic to full information. This table is not difficult to interpret. In row 
1, when given only basic information, consumers are willing to pay 29.83 and 36.36 
yuan, on average, for domestic and imported shrimp, respectively. There exists a 
significant premium of 6.54 yuan for imported over domestic shrimp. This signifies 
that the difference is not caused by a few extremely high bids, but an average high bid 
for imported shrimp across all participants. Reading this table as a whole, we find 
more interesting results. Comparing column 3 to column 7, with only basic 
information consumers are willing to pay more than 20% for imported and eco-labeled 
products. Providing private benefit information of sustainable certification increases 
consumer WTP for both domestic and imported products, but does not generate a 
premium for imported products. Further, providing public benefit information 
generates a premium for imported products. This means Chinese consumers view 
domestic and foreign producers as identical for providing private benefits, while they 
are willing to pay more for foreign producers to provide public benefit services. In 
other words, they do not trust domestic producers who provide public services. For 
eco-labels, consumers also act positively when public benefit information is provided, 
which means they still view sustainable aquaculture eco-labels as a public-service 
provider only, even when they were informed of private benefit information. It is not 
feasible to conduct a vertical comparison, since no tests have been conducted across 
information treatments and the sample sizes are not equal.  
Table 3.6 compares the bidding from information treatment groups against the 
basic information group (the control group is omitted in the table). Again, we group all 
bidding into four basic categories. Except for the non-labeled category, the remaining 
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categories show positive, significant premiums in the “public then private benefit 
information” treatment. This is because all three categories have an eco-labeled 
attribute involved, which is very effective in generating consumer WTP upon public 
benefit information provision according to the results from Table 3.5. For the non-
labeled category, private benefit information does a better job than public benefit 
information. Since non-labeled products do not provide any private benefits from 
certification, this premium could only come from the imported section of the non-
labeled products, and consumers might believe that imported products could also 
provide some private benefits even without certification, but not public benefits. No 
significant sequential effect was shown in the domestic category. While in the 
imported and eco-labeled categories, “public then private benefit” information has a 
greater impact than “private then public benefit” information. 
Since the categories in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 are not mutually exclusive, we can only 
have a basic understanding of the information impacts, and it is difficult to completely 
interpret some of the outcomes. Here we take it one step further, dividing all bidding 
into four mutually exclusive categories: domestic/and non-labeled (DN), 
domestic/eco-labeled (DE), imported/non-labeled (IN), and imported/eco-labeled (IE). 
Table 3.7 illustrates the interactive effects of country of origin and the eco-label. 
Results show that consumers are willing to pay more for an eco-label on domestic 
products than the same label on imported products when public benefit information is 
provided. This may indicate Chinese consumer lack of trust with the domestic 
producers’ level of compliance and certifiers’ credibility. Private benefit information 
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does not have a significant impact on consumers’ WTP for both domestic and 
imported eco-labels.  
Table 3.8 is similar to Table 3.6, but with more detailed categorization. As 
expected, whether the product is domestic or imported, non-labeled products show no 
positive response to public benefit information, but both domestic eco-labeled and 
imported eco-labeled products receive a high premium for public benefit information. 
In particular, a combination of public then private benefit information creates the 
highest premium. Recalling the results from Table 3.7, Chinese consumers generally 
prefer an eco-label on imported products. Surprisingly, however, we find that all 
information treatments have a higher premium for domestic eco-labeled products than 
imported eco-labeled products. It is not controversial to the previous results because 
this is a vertical comparison, which emphasizes the positive impact of public benefit 
information to domestic eco-labeled products. 
A few conclusions can be drawn from the above tables. Public benefit 
information has a significant impact on consumer WTP for certified products, whether 
domestic or imported, and it is necessary to provide public benefit information prior to 
private benefit information. 
There exists a preference for certification of imported products over domestic 
products, which reveals Chinese consumers’ lack of trust of certifiers’ credibility in 
China, as well as the level of compliance of domestic producers.  
Domestically certified products have a higher response to detailed certification 
information than imported certified products, which is a positive signal for domestic 
marketers and producers. 
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Regression and prediction 
The tables, above, provide a general understanding of how Chinese consumers view 
certification information on sustainably farmed seafood. To generate more reliable 
estimations and be able to make predications, a regression model is needed. A hedonic 
model is adopted for this analysis. 
Because this is a multiple-participant, multiple-round experiment, the bidding is 
panel data. Unobserved heterogeneity of participants can be eliminated through the 
within effects. The dependent variable here is the bidding price, which is consumers’ 
WTP. Independent variables are product attributes, information treatments and 
interaction terms. Below is the model specification: 
𝐵𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑛
3
𝑛=1
+ ∑ 𝛽2𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑘
4
𝑘=1
+ ∑ 𝛽3𝑡𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑡
12
𝑡=2
+ ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑛 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑘
4
𝑘=1
3
𝑛=1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
In this model, the dependent variable, 𝐵𝑖𝑡, is the bid from individual i in round t. 
𝛽0 is the constant term. Certification, Import, and Info are all binary dummy variables. 
There are four information dummies that cover five treatments: basic information, 
private benefit information, public benefit information, private + public benefit 
information, and public + private benefit information. The time variable, 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑡, is 
controlled for a learning effect through the experiment. Information variables are also 
interacted with import and certification variables. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the observation-specific error 
term. 
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A hedonic price model provides confirmation of our previous outcomes from 
average treatment effects and predicts the outcome based on information. A Hausman 
test was conducted to evaluate the fixed and random effects, and results suggest a 
random effects regression was more appropriate for this model. See Table 3.9 for the 
coefficient estimates.  
Two models are displayed in Table 3.9, one without interaction terms and one 
with them. The interaction terms between product attributes and information 
treatments have improved the explanatory power of the model and provided more 
insightful implications for the study. Predictions were made using Model 2, and Table 
3.10 was created to interpret their value.  
Results in Table 3.10 are very similar to Table 3.8, which once again reinforces 
the effectiveness of our regression model. Table 3.10 shows that for the DN product, 
only private benefit information and private + public benefit information treatments 
indicate significant differences from basic information. For the IN product, providing 
private benefit information generated some negative effects. This is reasonable, since 
there is no such benefit involved in this type of product. But for the DE and IE 
products, public benefit information generated positive, large numbers of premiums. 
Once again, providing public benefit first made a difference. Basically, the same 
conclusion can be made here as in the previous section. 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
Sustainable seafood programs are not a perfect system that could solve every fishery 
management issue immediately, but there is no doubt this is one of the most important 
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mechanisms to slow down the degradation of wild fishery stocks and improve coastal 
fishery communities. Sustainable seafood programs have evolved for about two 
decades as a market-based mechanism and have successfully incentivized fishmen/fish 
farmers globally to produce in a more sustainable manner. At the same time, industry 
and academia have never stopped doubting program designs and actual environmental 
impacts. Thus, when promoting these programs, especially in developing nations, we 
need to carefully study local markets and government situations. 
Historically, seafood has been a luxury product in China, and not until recently 
has it become an everyday food for most consumers. As household incomes continue 
to increase, average seafood consumption is predicted to reach 50 kg/year/capita. 
Since China has the world’s largest population, it will consume a significant amount 
of fish every year. Sustainable fisheries and aquaculture are the only ways for China to 
maintain healthy wild fish stocks and ocean environment without damaging global 
fisheries resources. Currently, neither China’s seafood industry nor general public has 
a thorough understanding of sustainable seafood, especially sustainable aquaculture. 
Urgent tasks include public education to raise consumer awareness, as well as modify 
current sustainable seafood programs to fit into Chinese consumers’ everyday life. 
This may be accomplished through the study of their preferences. 
In this chapter, Chinese consumer preferences for sustainably farmed seafood 
were studied using a sealed-bid, second-price experimental auction method. This is an 
incentive-compatible experiment design aiming to elicit consumers’ true WTP. 
Conclusions can be drawn as follows. 
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1. Chinese consumers believe that domestic products can provide better private 
benefits than imported products even without a certification, but they are willing to 
pay more for certification on imported products than domestic products, which means 
they have less trust in domestic producers. 
2. Chinese consumers are willing to pay a premium for eco-labeled products, 
especially when public benefit information is provided. Consumers can verify private 
benefits simply through consumption, but they need certification to verify public 
benefits on both products, since public benefits are credence attributes that are difficult 
to evaluate through consumption. That is why public benefit information generates a 
premium on eco-labeled products, but this is not the case for private benefit 
information. Consumers still consider sustainable aquaculture certification as a pure 
public benefit. Providing public benefit information can significantly increase 
consumers’ WTP for eco-labeled products. 
3. There exists a different marketing strategy for each type of product. For both 
domestic and imported eco-labeled products, it is best to provide public and then 
private benefit information, while for imported, non-labeled products, providing 
private benefit information first then public benefit information will generate better 
results. For domestic, non-labeled products, our results show private benefit 
information will increase the consumers’ WTP. This is a debatable result, however, 
since it is not reasonable for consumers to pay more for non-labeled products when 
certification information is provided. 
This research has resulted in some recommendations for both Chinese retailers 
and government. However, the research scope is limited to downtown Xiamen City, 
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which cannot represent the general public in China. Thus, retailers need to test the 
preferences of consumers within their service range and decide what types of seafood 
will generate the highest profit. For some retailers, even though sustainable seafood is 
not the best option to maximize profit currently, it may be beneficial to consider 
corporate social responsibility and the positive benefits generated by good business 
practices and a strong reputation. Once the main products are determined, the types of 
information consumers value and may be willing to pay more for, need to be 
determined. Results from this study can be a good reference for creating corporate 
marketing strategies. For the Chinese government, it is vital to rebuild consumer 
confidence regarding domestic farmed seafood products. Historically, Chinese 
consumers have preferred local seafood and agricultural products for both quality and 
emotional reasons. However, they switched to imported products due to seriously 
degraded product quality and safety concerns. Building a credible domestic 
certification system that covers both private and public benefits is an urgent task at 
hand. Last year Chinese authorities started to reform fisheries and the seafood industry 
to ensure product quality and safety. The next step is to focus on policy enforcement 
and supervision.  
In the next chapter, the experimental data is used again, but consumer perceptions 
of the quality, safety, and eco-friendliness of sustainably farmed seafood will be added 
to the analysis in order to test their WTP for these attributes.
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Self-actualization: 
responsible  
seafood 
Esteem needs: 
sustainable seafood 
Belongingness and love 
needs: 
product origin of seafood 
Safety needs: 
seafood security, safety 
Physiological needs: 
seafood quality 
Figure 3.1. An Application of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs to Seafood 
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Table 3.1. Distribution of Participant Demographics 
  
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Gender 
Female 53 69.74 69.74 
Male 23 30.26 100 
     
Age 
18–25 19 25 25 
26–30 27 35.53 60.53 
31–40 15 19.74 80.26 
41–50 9 11.84 92.11 
51–60 2 2.63 94.74 
60+ 4 5.26 100 
     
Job 
Housewife/husband 21 27.63 27.63 
R&D 6 7.89 35.52 
Sales/marketing 12 15.79 51.31 
Student 13 17.11 68.42 
Teacher 7 9.21 77.63 
Officer/other 17 22.37 100 
     
Consumption  
frequency (per month) 
1–3 50 65.79 65.79 
4–8 17 22.37 88.16 
8+ 9 11.84 100 
     
Sustainability  
knowledge 
0 32 42.11 42.11 
1 30 39.47 81.58 
2 13 17.11 98.68 
3 1 1.32 100 
 
    
Purchasing  
venue  
Supermarket 46 35.66 35.66 
Wet market 64 49.61 85.27 
Convenience store 10 7.75 93.02 
Fishmen 3 2.33 95.35 
Online 6 4.65 100.00 
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Domestic and Non-labelled Domestic and Eco-labelled 
Imported and Non-labelled Imported and Eco-labelled 
Figure 3.2. Display Photos Used in the Experiment 
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Table 3.3. Public and Private Benefit Information  
Public benefit  
information 
1 Mangrove and Wetland Conservation: Aquaculture facilities shall 
not be located in a mangrove or other wetland areas where they 
displace important natural habitats. Farm operations shall not 
damage wetlands, except for allowable purposes, which shall be 
mitigated. 
 
2 Effluent Management: Aquaculture facilities shall monitor their 
effluents to confirm compliance with the BAP effluent water 
quality criteria defined in Appendix A. Water quality 
measurements taken during the audit shall meet both BAP criteria 
and those of applicable government permits. Facilities shall 
comply with BAP’s final criteria within five years. Water 
exchange shall be limited to reduce overall environmental 
impacts. 
 
3 Soil and Water Conservation, Pond Sludge Management: Farm 
construction and operations shall not cause soil and water 
salinization or deplete groundwater in surrounding areas. Farms 
shall properly manage and dispose of sediment from ponds, 
raceways, canals, and settling basins. 
 
4 Fishmeal and Fish Oil Conservation: Farms shall accurately 
monitor feed inputs and minimize the use of fishmeal and fish oil 
derived from wild fisheries 
 
5 Stocking Sources and GMOs: Wild juveniles shall not be stocked. 
Certified farms shall comply with governmental regulations 
regarding the use of native and non-native species and genetically 
modified aquaculture species. 
 
6 Biodiversity and Wildlife Protection: Certified farms shall 
manage physical interactions with wildlife. 
 
7 Storage and Disposal of Farm Supplies and Waste: Fuel, 
lubricants and agricultural chemicals shall be stored and disposed 
of in a safe and responsible manner. Paper and plastic refuse shall 
be disposed of in a prompt, sanitary, and responsible way. 
Excessive accumulation of waste and/or discarded farm supplies 
and equipment shall be removed and disposed of responsibly.  
 
8 Animal Health and Welfare: Producers shall demonstrate that all 
operations on farms are designed and operated with animal 
welfare in mind, and maximum survival shall be sought. 
Employees shall be trained to provide appropriate levels of 
husbandry. 
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Table 3.3. Public and Private Benefit Information (continued) 
Private benefit  
information 
1 Chemical and Drug Management: Proactively prohibited 
antibiotics, drugs, and other chemical compounds shall not be 
used. Other therapeutic agents shall be used as directed on product 
labels for control of diagnosed diseases or required pond 
management, and not for prophylactic purposes without 
veterinary oversight. 
 
2 Microbial Sanitation, Hygiene: Human waste and untreated 
animal manure shall be prevented from contaminating pond 
waters. Domestic sewage shall be treated and not contaminate 
surrounding areas. 
 
3 Disease Control: Biosecurity controls shall be in place to prevent 
the introduction and/or spread of disease agents and disease on the 
farm. These include regular disease surveillance, sanitation of 
equipment and personnel, quarantine of diseased animals, and 
controlled movement of personnel and equipment. Farm staff and 
visitors shall be trained in and apply biosecurity measures. 
 
4 Harvest and Transport: Aquacultured products shall be harvested 
and transported to processing plants or other markets in a manner 
that maintains temperature control and prevents physical damage 
or contamination. Sulphites shall be handled responsibly to 
control risks to consumers and the environment. 
 
5 Traceability: To establish product traceability, the following data 
shall be recorded for each culture unit and each production cycle:  
Culture unit identification number 
Unit area or volume 
Stocking date 
Quantity of fingerlings or postlarvae stocked 
Source of fingerlings or postlarvae (hatchery) 
Antibiotic and drug use 
Sulfite use in shrimp 
Herbicide, algaecide, and other pesticide use 
Manufacturer and lot number for each feed used 
Harvest date and quantity 
Movement document number (if applicable) 
Processing plant(s) or purchaser(s) (Identify all if any harvest 
quantity goes to more than one plant or purchaser) 
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Table 3.4. Summary Statistics of the Main Variables  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
      Bid 936 34.93536 19.74875 0 200 
      Domestic/non-labeled 936 0.25 0.433244 0 1 
Domestic/eco-labeled 936 0.25 0.433244 0 1 
Imported/non-labeled 936 0.25 0.433244 0 1 
Imported/eco-labeled 936 0.25 0.433244 0 1 
      Basic information 936 0.333333 0.471657 0 1 
Private benefit information 936 0.17094 0.376658 0 1 
Public benefit information 936 0.162393 0.369008 0 1 
Private+public benefit info. 936 0.17094 0.376658 0 1 
Public+private benefit info. 936 0.162393 0.369008 0 1 
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Table 3.9. Coefficient Estimates 
Variable 
Bidding (RMB: yuan) 
(1) (2) 
   
Constant 20.788*** 20.788*** 
 (2.232) (2.232) 
Domestic & eco-labeled (DE, yes=1, otherwise=0) 9.239*** 6.593*** 
 
(1.073) (1.694) 
Imported & non-labeled (IN, yes=1, otherwise=0) 4.009*** 4.637*** 
 
(1.073) (1.694) 
Imported & eco-labeled (IE, yes=1, otherwise=0) 16.966*** 14.763*** 
 
(1.071) (1.692) 
Only private benefit info (yes=1, otherwise=0) 16.044*** 21.243*** 
 
(2.048) (2.608) 
Only public benefit info (yes=1, otherwise=0) 16.045*** 8.883*** 
 
(2.068) (2.634) 
Private then public benefit info (yes=1, otherwise=0) 17.884*** 21.971*** 
 
(2.048) (2.608) 
Public then private benefit info (yes=1, otherwise=0) 18.029*** 8.490*** 
 
(2.068) (2.634) 
DE * private benefit info 
 
–5.690* 
  
(2.909) 
IN * private benefit info 
 
–4.522 
  
(2.909) 
IE * private benefit info 
 
–11.136*** 
  
(2.906) 
DE * public benefit info 
 
11.075*** 
  
(2.957) 
IN * public benefit info 
 
2.163 
  
(2.957) 
IE* public benefit info 
 
15.184*** 
  
(2.955) 
DE * Private then public benefit info 
 
–4.299 
  
(2.909) 
IN * Private then public benefit info 
 
–2.844 
  
(2.909) 
IE * Private then public benefit info  –9.836*** 
  (2.906) 
DE * Public then private benefit info  15.712*** 
  (2.957) 
IN* Public then private benefit info  1.721 
  (2.957) 
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Table 3.9. Coefficient Estimates (continued) 
IE* Public then private benefit info  20.421*** 
  (2.955) 
 
Observations 933 933 
Number of id 78 78 
Wald chi-square statistics 308.29 498.94 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
ESTIMATION OF CHINESE CONSUMER WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR THE 
QUALITY, SAFETY AND ECO-FRIENDLINESS OF SUSTAINABLY FARMED 
SEAFOOD 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters, we discussed the impact of information on the price for 
sustainably farmed seafood. Regardless if market data or experiment data were used, 
we were only able to evaluate explicitly revealed seafood attributes, such as country of 
origin and certification, and were unsure to what extent consumers understood the 
information and how they used it for decision making. Lusk and his colleagues 
conducted two non-hypothetical choice experiments and one non-hypothetical 
experimental auction to demonstrate the importance of incorporating consumers’ 
subjective perceptions when testing their food preferences (Lusk and Schroeder 2004; 
Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder 2004; Lusk, Schroeder, and Tonsor 2014). Usually 
food attributes are a mixture of basic elements; thus, it is not easy to evaluate them 
directly. For example the “imported” attribute might be a representation of both 
quality and safety for Chinese consumers, and the “eco-label” attribute could be a 
mixture of quality, safety, and eco-friendliness. Previously, we estimated the value of 
“imported” and “eco-label” attributes, but could not evaluate consumers’ WTP for 
quality, safety, and eco-friendliness because they were not expressed explicitly. In this 
chapter, we assume that product quality, safety, and eco-friendliness are three basic 
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components of consumers’ utility function. Product quality and safety have always 
been primary attributes in consumer preference studies (Zeithaml 1988; Grunert 2002; 
Fonner and Sylvia 2015; Han and Bi 2016). Credence attributes, like eco-friendliness, 
pique researchers’ interest, as consumer awareness has steadily increased over the past 
decade (Brécard et al. 2012; Xu et al. 2012; Sogn-Grundvåg, Larsen, and Young 
2014; Blomquist, Bartolino, and Waldo 2015). Other factors that might affect 
consumer preferences, such as workers’ welfare, gender equality, and animal welfare, 
are not considered explicitly in this research. Only with a deeper understanding of 
consumer preferences of these basic elements could we develop more efficient and 
effective marketing strategies to capture the optimal value for sustainably farmed 
seafood. 
Following previous experimental auctions, we asked participants to report their 
perceptions of product quality, safety, and eco-friendliness at the end of each round. A 
panel data set was constructed through the multiple-round experiment. Using a 
random-effects GLS regression model, regression results found out that for 500 grams 
of medium-size frozen raw white-leg shrimp, consumers with a mixed level of 
information generally were willing to pay 30.54 yuan for guaranteed good quality, 
19.84 yuan for guaranteed health safety, 12.16 yuan for eco-friendliness, and 3.53 
yuan for other guaranteed attributes. Taking the information treatments into 
consideration, with only basic information consumers tend to pay more for guaranteed 
quality. Once they received private and public benefit information, they reallocated a 
portion of payment from quality to safety and eco-friendliness, increasing their total 
WTP. Results from this study could be used as marketing strategies for sustainable 
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seafood, as well as government policy making. The remainder of this chapter is 
arranged as following. In next section, we discuss the data acquired from the previous 
experiment. After that, the model specification and estimation results are reported. 
Finally, conclusions are presented. 
 
Data description 
Consumer perception data and bidding information were collected in the experiment. 
The procedure is identical to the auctions in Chapter 3. The questions are: “To what 
extent ( %) do you believe that this product is of 100% quality/safety/eco-
friendliness?” Here, no specific explanation or definition of the quality, safety, and 
eco-friendliness was provided. Instead, a few examples were given to guide them 
while building their evaluation system based on their knowledge and consumption 
experiences. For instance, participants were told that quality indicators could be 
seafood freshness, taste, or presentation; indicators of safety could be the level of 
antibiotic use or heavy metal residues; indicators for eco-friendliness could be the 
impact on coastal wetlands or the use of fishmeal that contains wild fish. Thus, the 
questions were reformed as: “To what extent do you believe that this shrimp is fresh 
enough to make you 100% satisfied?” “To what extent do you believe that the heavy 
metal level within this shrimp makes you not to worry about the negative health 
impact by consuming it?” “To what extent do you believe that farming this shrimp 
will not cause damage the wetland in its surroundings?”  
Recalling the research design in Chapter 3, 8 sessions of sealed-bid, second-price 
auctions were conducted, with 12 rounds in each session. To enlarge the sample size 
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and gain better estimation results, three additional sessions, conducted in Beijing, were 
added to the data set. Due to time constraints, only three of eight sessions were 
finished as planned, but the additional data were very helpful for our analysis. The 
three sessions doubled our observations for the basic information, private benefit 
information, and private + public benefit information treatment groups. A session 
started round 1 with basic information on country of origin and certification, then 
added different information to participants every four rounds. During sessions 1 to 4, 
basic information appeared from rounds 1 to round 4. Then private benefit information 
was then provided from rounds 5 to 9, and public benefit information was added in the 
last four rounds. In sessions 5 to 8 the experiment followed the same logic, but 
reversed the order of private benefit information and public benefit information. 
Beijing sessions are number sessions 9, 10, and 11, which are repetitions of session 1, 
2, and 3. Participant perceptions of quality, safety, and eco-friendliness for each round 
were collected after bidding was complete. Table 4.1 shows the summary statistics of 
consumer bids and perceptions of product quality, safety, and eco-friendliness. In 
general people have similar perceptions about seafood quality and safety, but a slightly 
lower confidence in eco-friendliness. The average bid of these 11 sessions is about 38 
yuan, and consumers believe that seafood in the market have only 65% chance to 
satisfy them in quality and safety, only 50% chance to be eco-friendly. In addition to 
Table 4.1, Figure 4.1 summarizes consumer bids and perceptions of product quality, 
safety, and eco-friendliness by product type and information treatment. This summary 
indicates that for all four types of products, consumers have similar perceptions about 
quality and safety, both of which are much higher than their perception of eco-
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friendliness. This is expected, as seafood eco-friendliness is a new concept in China 
that has not been acknowledged and accepted by general public. For information 
treatment effects, consumers should reevaluate their perceptions of non-labeled 
products if they receive additional certification information; for eco-labeled products, 
private benefit information is likely to increase their perceptions of quality and safety, 
and public benefit information should increase their perception in eco-friendliness. 
Figure 4.1 shows that for both domestic/non-labeled and imported/non-labeled 
products, providing public benefit information has a negative impact on perceptions 
for all three factors, but providing private benefit information can increase consumer 
perceptions. For eco-labeled products, private benefit information has no positive 
impact, but public benefit information increases consumers’ perceptions in all three 
areas. For all products, it is the first piece of information that matters most, as the 
second piece does not add too much to consumer opinion. Figure 4.1 also shows that 
consumers’ bids are correlated with their perceptions, which confirms the original 
hypothesis. The next step is to calculate consumers’ WTP for quality, safety, and eco-
friendliness. 
 
Model specification and estimation 
Following Lusk, Schroeder, and Tonsor (2014), a random expected utility model is 
used to evaluate consumers’ expected utility for different types of farmed seafood 
products: 
𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑘 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑘
𝑥𝑗𝑈(𝑥𝑗)
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝛼𝑦 + 𝛾𝑘 .   (1) 
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𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑘 is the expected utility of individual i for product k, where k is one of the four 
types of seafood: domestic/non-labeled (DN), domestic/eco-labeled (DE), 
imported/non-labeled (IN), and imported/eco-labeled (IE). DN is used as the basic 
group. 
𝑝𝑖𝑘
𝑥𝑗
 is the perception of individual i for attribute 𝑥𝑗 of product k, where 𝑥𝑗 can be 
quality, safety, or eco-friendliness. 𝑈(𝑥𝑗) is the the utility of attribute 𝑥𝑗, y is the 
income variable, and 𝛼 is the marginal utility of income. 𝛾𝑘 is the subject invariant 
constant for product k. For example, 𝛾𝐼𝐸 is the utility that the consumer gains from 
imported/eco-labeled seafood not accounted for by attribute quality, safety, or eco-
friendliness. From equation (1), two utility functions of DN and DE are formed as 
follows: 
𝐸𝑈𝑖 𝐷𝑁 = 𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝑁
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑈(𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝑁
𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑈(𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦) + 𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝑁
𝑒𝑐𝑜 𝑈(𝑒𝑐𝑜) + 𝛼𝑦 + 𝛾𝐷𝑁 
(2) 
𝐸𝑈𝑖 𝐷𝐸 = 𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝐸
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑈(𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝐸
𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑈(𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦) + 𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝐸
𝑒𝑐𝑜 𝑈(𝑒𝑐𝑜) + 𝛼𝑦 + 𝛾𝐷𝐸. 
(3) 
Suppose consumer i is willing to pay ∆𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖 𝐷𝐸→𝐷𝑁 to switch from DN to DE, 
then the equation to connect the two functions above is: 
𝐸𝑈𝑖 𝐷𝐸 = 𝐸𝑈𝑖 𝐷𝑁 + 𝛼∆𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖 𝐷𝐸→𝐷𝑁.   (4) 
Substituting equations (2) and (3) into (4) and rearranging gives the final 
regression model:  
∆𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖 𝐷𝑁→𝑘 =
𝑈(𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)
𝛼
∆𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝑁→𝑘
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
𝑈(𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦)
𝛼
∆𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝑁→𝑘
𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 +
𝑈(𝑒𝑐𝑜)
𝛼
∆𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝑁→𝑘
𝑒𝑐𝑜
+
∆𝛾𝐷𝑁→𝑘
𝛼
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K is either product DE, IN, or IE. ∆𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖 𝐷𝑁→𝑘 is the bid difference of individual 
i between product DN and product k from the auction. ∆𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝑁→𝑘
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
 is the difference of 
quality perception of individual i between product DN and k. ∆𝑝𝑖 𝑘→𝐷𝑁
𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦
 is the 
difference of safety perception of individual i between product DN and k. ∆𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝑁→𝑘
𝑒𝑐𝑜 is 
the difference of the eco-friendliness perception of individual i between product DN 
and k. The coefficients of 
𝑈(𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)
𝛼
, 
𝑈(𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦)
𝛼
, 
𝑈(𝑒𝑐𝑜)
𝛼
, and 
(𝛾𝑘−𝛾𝐷𝑁)
𝛼
 are the marginal 
utilities of income; namely, the WTP for quality, safety, eco-friendliness, and other 
attributes not accounted for by the previous three. 
The original data were reformed into new panel data according to the structure of 
the regression model. For each individual, their bids and perceptions of DE, IN, and IE 
products are deducted by those of the DN products. A random-effects panel data 
regression was suggested by Hausman test to estimate the coefficients. 
 
Estimation results 
Table 4.2 summarizes six different regressions by information treatment. In Column 
(1), all data were pooled by consumer preferences with mixed levels of information. 
Results suggest that for 500 grams of medium-size, frozen raw white-leg shrimp, 
consumers are willing to pay 30.54 yuan for guaranteed good quality, 19.84 yuan for 
guaranteed health safety, 12.16 yuan for eco-friendliness, and 3.53 yuan for all other 
guaranteed attributes. This means that if there is a shrimp product with 100% 
assurance of good quality, health safety, and eco-friendliness, consumers are willing to 
pay about 66 yuan; the maximum value for this type of shrimp. Shrimp with other 
sizes or product forms may have different values, but consumers allocate their WTP at 
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the same ratio among these attributes which is about 46, 30, 18, and 6%, respectively. 
This fits the previous understanding of consumer preferences according to the 
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs: Quality comes first as the basic food attribute for 
physiological needs; safety comes second to satisfy consumer security or health needs, 
and finally eco-friendliness works to fulfill the need for self-actualization.  
Columns (2) to (7) are subsamples of the pooled data under different information 
scenarios. There is an observed value shifting among three factors when different 
information is provided. Column (2) represents the basic information scenario where 
consumers are WTP for 38.94 yuan, on average, for guaranteed quality of a shrimp 
product, nothing for guaranteed safety, and 10.1 yuan for eco-friendliness. All other 
factors contribute 3.44 yuan. Information for this subsample is similar to most Chinese 
consumers’ knowledge level. When evaluating seafood with country of origin and 
eco-label information only, they tend to pay more when retailers guarantee higher 
quality. They choose not to believe the health safety guarantee because trust was 
broken after a few food safety incidents occurred. They are willing to pay a small 
amount for the eco-friendliness when it’s guaranteed. Eco-friendliness is different 
from safety, because it is impossible to test and no negative incidents have occurred in 
China. Thus, consumers may choose to believe it. When private benefit information 
was provided (Column 3), consumers gained understanding of certification standards 
that could apply to both quality and health safety. Thus, WTP for guaranteed quality 
stays almost the same; but WTP for guaranteed safety increases significantly to 30.7 
yuan. This change indicates the high demand for food safety, which would have been 
ignored if no private benefit information was provided. WTP for eco-friendliness is 
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not significant. When public benefit information was added to private benefit 
information (Column 5), all three attributes are significant and positive. Total WTP 
remains at the same level as private benefit information, but the distribution changes 
slightly. Because consumers received more information about environmental 
protection from the certified farm, they put some resources from quality and safety 
into eco-friendliness.  
For the other set of information treatments, public benefit information was 
provided first (Column 4), then private benefit information was added (Column 6). 
However, the results were not as significant as the first set. It could be caused by the 
small sample size—there are only 38 participants compared to 70 in the first set. The 
last column is the full information treatment, which is a pool of Columns (6) and (7). 
Outcomes show that consumers pay attention to all three factors, but they lower the 
weight on quality and allocate more resources to safety and eco-friendliness due to 
two pieces of additional information. 
As a result of this data, some marketing suggestions were formed for promoting 
sustainably farmed seafood in China. First, when sustainably farmed seafood enters a 
new market in a developing country like China, it will be met by consumers with very 
limited seafood sustainability knowledge, as shown in the demographic survey in 
Chapter 3. This is because they have not been exposed to sustainable seafood 
certification standards or benefits guaranteed by the eco-label. More familiar 
information is mandated country of origin and production method information printed 
on the sales label in the grocery store. This is similar to our basic information scenario. 
An average Chinese retailer would not invest resources to provide additional 
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information to educate consumers on food safety and eco-friendliness.  They are 
correct, since a large portion of consumer WTP is proven spending on the guaranteed 
quality. The most effective marketing strategy for retailers is to convince their 
customers of their products’ quality. However they are not able to predict neither the 
value of information nor the consumers’ true WTP. When consumers are provided full 
information about sustainable aquaculture certification and promised guaranteed 
attributes, their hidden WTP for health, safety and eco-friendliness will be extracted, 
and the total WTP for the product will be much higher than with basic information 
only. To summarize, it is a two-step solution. First, educate consumers regarding 
sustainable aquaculture certification, preferably private benefit information first, then 
public benefit information. Second, guarantee the consumer a high percentage of one 
or a few attributes, since there is no single product that can guarantee 100% quality, 
safety, and eco-friendliness simultaneously. A certified aquaculture product, 
depending on what kind of certification it acquires, usually maintains a high level of 
one or a few attributes. For example, ASC certification has very stringent 
requirements for all three attributes; BAP certification has less stringent standards, but 
covers all the attributes; the Chinese local Non-harmless Agriculture certification 
focuses more on food safety; and Organic certification may advertise itself as high-
quality and eco-friendly. Finally, retailers should strive to avoid seafood fraud, 
whether intentional or accidental, as it is extremely difficult to rebuild Chinese 
consumers’ trust in food safety.  
 
Conclusion 
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Promotion of sustainable seafood has been slow in the Chinese market, despite 
constant industry efforts. Consumers and retailers are realizing the importance of 
sustainable seafood and are willing to play a role, but on the demand side, consumers 
have not received useful information when faced with a decision. On the supply end, 
retailers did not have full understanding of consumer preferences, such as how they 
allocate their money toward seafood attributes. Thus, the typical marketing strategy 
still focuses on quality attributes like freshness and taste, which falls short of 
developing the full value of sustainably farmed seafood. Gradually retailers lose 
interest in and incentives to sell sustainable seafood, because no or very limited profit 
is generated. 
This study aims to provide scientific suggestions for promoting sustainable 
seafood in China based on consumer preference analysis. Built upon a popular 
experimental auction method, it incorporates consumers’ subjective perceptions on 
basic seafood attributes in order to break down their WTP to the principal level. 
Multiple information treatments are designed to obtain more detailed solutions. A 
random expected utility model was used to construct the regression model, and the 
results indicate that with only basic information, such as country of origin and eco-
labeling, consumers are willing to pay about 53 yuan (about US $8) for 500 grams of 
farmed shrimp with a 100% guarantee of quality, safety, and eco-friendliness. 
Seventy-three percent of the WTP is due to the guaranteed quality, 0% for safety, and 
18% for eco-friendliness. Providing private benefit information of certification 
increases consumers’ total WTP to 69 yuan (about US $10). Most of this comes from 
guaranteed safety. Lastly, providing additional information of public benefit does not 
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increase consumers’ total WTP, but successfully reallocates payment from quality to 
safety and eco-friendliness, with a 20% increase for eco-friendliness. In sum, for 
retailers interested in sustainably farmed seafood, it is essential to understand the 
requirement levels of quality, safety, and eco-friendliness provided by different 
seafood certification programs. They can then choose the appropriate products 
according to corporate short- and long-term seafood marketing objectives and goals. 
Based on these products, they then need to make a commitment to one or a few of the 
attributes. Finally, they need to educate their consumers with the private and public 
benefit information about the different sustainable seafood certifications.
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics of Main Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Bid 1296 37.594 21.345 0 200 
Quality perception 1296 0.649 0.203 0.05 1 
Safety perception 1296 0.641 0.224 0.05 1 
Eco-friendliness 
perception 
1296 0.536 0.263 0 1 
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Figure 4.1. Summary of Consumers' Perceptions and Bids
by Product Type and Information
Quality Safety
Eco-friendliness  Bid
Notes: DN indicates domestic/non-labeled shrimp; DE indicates domestic/eco-labeled shrimp; IN 
indicates imported/non-labeled shrimp; IE indicates imported/eco-labeled shrimp. Basic information 
includes whether or not the products are imported or eco-labeled. Private benefit and public benefit are 
both single pieces of information. Public+private and private+public are both full pieces information, 
but given in different sequences. The unit for perceptions is percentage, and the unit for bid is the 
Chinese yuan. 
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Table 4.2. Consumer WTP for Quality, Safety, and Eco-friendliness by Information Treatment 
 
(1) Pooled (2) Basic (3) Private (4) Public (5) Pri+Pub (6) Pub+Pri (7) Full 
VARIABLES Δ(Bid) 
Δ(Quality) 30.536*** 38.937*** 35.081*** 40.401*** 23.827** 33.899** 24.185*** 
 
(3.608) (6.776) (7.721) (12.962) (11.122) (13.166) (8.504) 
Δ (Safety) 19.839*** 6.771 30.704*** 4.671 27.326** 19.496* 21.382** 
 
(3.465) (6.142) (8.992) (10.983) (11.857) (11.302) (8.696) 
Δ (Eco) 12.160*** 10.100** 1.339 8.079 14.956* 2.096 13.354** 
 
(2.154) (4.611) (7.177) (5.976) (8.180) (5.175) (5.458) 
Constant 3.531*** 3.437*** 3.315*** 3.029** 4.889*** 3.363** 6.217*** 
 
(0.331) (0.509) (0.564) (1.212) (0.739) (1.662) (1.470) 
        
Observations 1,296 432 280 152 280 152 324 
R-squared 0.542 0.478 0.675 0.427 0.652 0.376 0.465 
N of subject 108 108 70 38 70 38 108 
Notes: This is a summation of six individual regressions of consumer bidding differences and their perception 
difference of quality, safety, and eco-friendliness under various information treatments. Column (1) uses the pooled 
data of all information treatments. Basic information includes: country of origin and certification, no detailed 
information is provided. Private benefit and public benefit are both single pieces of information that state different 
standards of the eco-label. Public+private and private+public are both full pieces information, but given in different 
sequences. The coefficients represent consumer WTP for quality, safety, and eco-friendliness. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper focuses on the sustainably farmed seafood market in China, using both 
real market data and non-hypothetical experimental auction data to evaluate the impact 
of country of origin, eco-label, and certification standard information on consumer 
preferences. By incorporating consumers’ subjective perceptions of quality, safety, 
and eco-friendliness, we succeed in determining consumer WTP for products into their 
WTP for basic product attributes. Research findings can be used to assist retailers in 
designing marketing strategies. This can also provide policy implications for 
governmental agencies in fishery and food industries. 
The first study takes advantage of the well-developed online retail market in 
China and creates a data set consisting of weekly price and product characteristic 
information. A log-linear regression suggests that seafood safety is the biggest concern 
of Chinese consumers, while an eco-label does not have a positive influence. When 
there is no safety information, there are 6–14% premiums for imported over domestic 
shrimp. For domestic shrimp, there is a 36% premium with safety information, while 
safety information does not generate a premium for imported products. Results 
indicate the importance of providing a safety guarantee for domestic shrimp. Without 
safety information, consumers would rather spend more on imported products. 
Our second study uses an experimental auction method and adds private benefit 
and public benefit information from certification standards into the experiment in 
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order to simulate different market scenarios. Consumer WTP for product attributes 
tested in this study should be more accurate and reliable since we can control how they 
receive information and ensure they consider it when making decisions. A random-
effects panel data regression suggests that for eco-labeled products, domestic or 
imported, it is best to provide public and then private benefit information. While for 
imported/non-labeled products, providing private benefit information first then public 
benefit information will lead to higher prices. For domestic/non-labeled products, our 
results show private benefit information will increase the consumer WTP. This is still 
a debatable result, since it is not reasonable for consumers to pay more for non-labeled 
products when they have certification information.  
The third study is the continuation of the experiment. We incorporate consumers’ 
subjective perceptions of product quality, safety, and eco-friendliness into the analysis 
to provide a more detailed understanding of their preferences. The regression model is 
built on a random expected utility model. By estimating the effects of consumer 
perception variations in those three basic attributes on their bidding variations, we 
obtained the marginal utility on income that consumers place on each attribute—WTP 
for product quality, safety, and eco-friendliness. Results indicate that with only basic 
information of country of origin and eco-labeling, consumers are willing to pay about 
53 yuan for 500 grams of farmed shrimp with a 100% guarantee of quality, safety, and 
eco-friendliness. Seventy-three percent of their WTP is due to guaranteed quality, 0% 
for safety, and 18% for eco-friendliness. Recalling our first study of the online retail 
market, consumers received only basic information. The average price was 57 yuan 
per 500 grams, which is surprisingly similar to our predicted result. Providing private 
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benefit information of certification increases consumer total WTP to 69 yuan (about 
US $10). Most of this comes from the payment for guaranteed safety. Lastly, 
providing additional information of public benefit does not increase consumers’ total 
WTP, but successfully reallocates the payment from quality to safety and eco-
friendliness, with a 20% increase for eco-friendliness. 
Combining the three studies, we can draw the following conclusions. Imported 
seafood is the Chinese consumers’ first choice when there is no safety information. 
Guaranteed safety can generate a high premium on domestic seafood, but not 
imported. An eco-label does not generate a price premium in the current market, but 
consumers are willing to pay for it as long as they are educated with the public benefit 
information of the sustainable certification. Full certification information can 
significantly increase consumer WTP for sustainably farmed seafood, especially for 
safety and eco-friendliness. In sum, this study confirms the great potential of the 
sustainably farmed seafood market in China. Seafood producers and retailers should 
join sustainable seafood programs based on their own needs, but most importantly 
educate their consumers about the private and public benefits they can enjoy through 
consumption of sustainably farmed seafood products.   
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